| Revisiting Folk Moral Realism T Pölzler Review of Philosophy & Psychology, 2016 | 16 | 2016 |
| Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences T Pölzler Routledge, 2018 | 15 | 2018 |
| Absurdism as Self-Help: Resolving an Essential Inconsistency in Camus’ Early Philosophy T Pölzler Journal of Camus Studies 2014, 91-102, 2014 | 7 | 2014 |
| Climate Change Inaction and Moral Nihilism T Pölzler Ethics, Policy & Environment 18 (2), 202-214, 2015 | 6 | 2015 |
| How to Measure Moral Realism T Pölzler Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1-24, 2018 | 5 | 2018 |
| Moral Judgements and Emotions: A Less Intimate Relationship than Recently Claimed T Pölzler Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 35 (3), 177-195, 2015 | 5 | 2015 |
| Camus’ Feeling of the Absurd T Pölzler The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2018 | 4 | 2018 |
| Are Moral Judgements Adaptations? Three Reasons Why It Is so Difficult to Tell T Pölzler South African Journal of Philosophy, 2017 | 4 | 2017 |
| Camus' Early Logic of the Absurd T Pölzler Journal of Camus Studies 2011, 98-117, 2011 | 4 | 2011 |
| On the Contribution of Philosophical and Geoscientific Inquiry to Geoethics (qua Applied Ethics) T Pölzler Annals of Geophysics 60, 2017 | 3 | 2017 |
| Natural Hazards and the Normative Significance of Expectations in Protecting Alpine Communities F Ortner, T Pölzler, LH Meyer, O Sass European Geosciences Union General Assembly, 2017 | 3 | 2017 |
| Further Problems with Projectivism T Pölzler South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (1), 92-102, 2016 | 3 | 2016 |
| Anti-Realist Pluralism: A New Approach to Folk Metaethics T Pölzler, J Wright Review of Philosophy & Psychology, 2019 | 2 | 2019 |
| Can the Empirical Sciences Contribute to the Moral Realism/Anti-Realism Debate? T Pölzler Synthese, 2017 | 2 | 2017 |
| Wie schlüssig ist Albert Camus’ frühe „Logik des Absurden“? T Pölzler Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 41 (1), 59-76, 2016 | 2 | 2016 |
| Ethics and Risks: Approaches and Issues (Introduction to Special Issue) A Placani, E Düvel, T Pölzler Ethical Perspectives 25 (3), 355-361, 2018 | 1 | 2018 |
| Special Issue on “Legitimate Expectations” L Meyer, T Pölzler, P Sanklecha Moral Philosophy & Politics 4 (2), 2017 | 1 | 2017 |
| Introduction to the Special Issue on Legitimate Expectations L Meyer, T Pölzler, P Sanklecha Moral Philosophy and Politics 4 (2), 173-175, 2017 | 1 | 2017 |
| Moral Disagreement, Anti-Realism, and the Worry about Overgeneralization T Pölzler 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 245-247, 2015 | 1 | 2015 |
| Empirical Research on Folk Moral Objectivism T Pölzler, J Wright Philosophy Compass, 2019 | | 2019 |
Lukas H. MeyerProf. für Philosophie, Karl-Franzens-Universität GrazBestätigte E-Mail-Adresse bei uni-graz.at
