| Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences T Pölzler Routledge, 2018 | 26 | 2018 |
| Revisiting Folk Moral Realism T Pölzler Review of Philosophy & Psychology, 2016 | 19 | 2016 |
| Anti-Realist Pluralism: A New Approach to Folk Metaethics T Pölzler, J Wright Review of Philosophy & Psychology, 2019 | 10 | 2019 |
| How to Measure Moral Realism T Pölzler Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1-24, 2018 | 9 | 2018 |
| Absurdism as Self-Help: Resolving an Essential Inconsistency in Camus’ Early Philosophy T Pölzler Journal of Camus Studies 2014, 91-102, 2014 | 8 | 2014 |
| Camus’ Feeling of the Absurd T Pölzler The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2018 | 6 | 2018 |
| Can the Empirical Sciences Contribute to the Moral Realism/Anti-Realism Debate? T Pölzler Synthese, 2017 | 6 | 2017 |
| Moral Judgements and Emotions: A Less Intimate Relationship than Recently Claimed T Pölzler Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 35 (3), 177-195, 2015 | 6 | 2015 |
| Climate Change Inaction and Moral Nihilism T Pölzler Ethics, Policy & Environment 18 (2), 202-214, 2015 | 6 | 2015 |
| Empirical Research on Folk Moral Objectivism T Pölzler, J Wright Philosophy Compass, 2019 | 5 | 2019 |
| Camus' Early Logic of the Absurd T Pölzler Journal of Camus Studies 2011, 98-117, 2011 | 5 | 2011 |
| On the Contribution of Philosophical and Geoscientific Inquiry to Geoethics (qua Applied Ethics) T Pölzler Annals of Geophysics 60, 2017 | 4 | 2017 |
| Are Moral Judgements Adaptations? Three Reasons Why It Is so Difficult to Tell T Pölzler South African Journal of Philosophy, 2017 | 4 | 2017 |
| Further Problems with Projectivism T Pölzler South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (1), 92-102, 2016 | 4 | 2016 |
| An Empirical Argument against Moral Non-Cognitivism T Pölzler, J Wright Inquiry, 2020 | 3 | 2020 |
| Basic Needs and Sufficiency: The Foundations of Intergenerational Justice L Meyer, T Pölzler The Oxford Handbook of Intergenerational Ethics, 2020 | 3* | 2020 |
| Natural Hazards and the Normative Significance of Expectations in Protecting Alpine Communities F Ortner, T Pölzler, LH Meyer, O Sass European Geosciences Union General Assembly, 2017 | 3 | 2017 |
| Wie schlüssig ist Albert Camus’ frühe „Logik des Absurden“? T Pölzler Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 41 (1), 59-76, 2016 | 3 | 2016 |
| Against Overgeneralization Objections to the Argument from Moral Disagreement T Pölzler South African Journal of Philosophy 39 (3), 261-273, 2020 | 1 | 2020 |
| X-Phi and Impartiality Thought Experiments: Investigating the Veil of Ignorance N Paulo, T Pölzler Diametros, 2020 | 1 | 2020 |
Lukas H. MeyerProf. für Philosophie, Karl-Franzens-Universität GrazBestätigte E-Mail-Adresse bei uni-graz.at
